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Abstract—In this paper, we introduce a strong adversarial
attack, referred to as the flipping attack, on Direct-Sequence
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) systems. In this attack, the attacker,
which is appropriately positioned between the transmitter and
the receiver, instantaneously flips the transmitted symbols in the
air at 50% rate, thereby driving the channel capacity to zero.
Unlike the traditional jamming attack, this attack, when perfectly
executed, cannot be detected at the receiver using signal-to-
noise-ratio measurements. However, this attack necessitates the
attacker to perfectly know the realizations of all the channels in
the model. We first introduce the consequences of the flipping
attack on narrowband frequency-flat channels, and subsequently
discuss its feasibility in wideband frequency-selective channels.
From the legitimate users’ perspective, we present a method
to detect this attack and also propose heuristics to improve
the error-performance under the attack. We emphasize that
future cyber-physical systems that employ DSSS should design
transceivers to detect the proposed flipping attack, and then
apply appropriate countermeasures.
I. INTRODUCTION
With wireless communication being an integral part of most
cyber-physical systems [1], e.g. urban transportation, smart-
grid and other IOT systems, it is imperative to not just secure
wireless links from external attacks such as jamming, but also
envision new attacks and provide suitable countermeasures
against them. In this paper, we are interested in external
attacks that can drive the channel capacity of communication
between two legitimate users to zero. Although, jamming is
a straightforward way of realizing such an objective, such
attacks can be detected at the legitimate users by measuring
their signal-to-interference-noise-ratio (SINR). In other words,
jamming is not a stealth attack. From the jammer’s perspec-
tive, while attack detection is a disadvantage, the jammer need
not know the wireless channel between the source and the
destination (other than the band of communication). In this
paper, we would like to ask a converse question: Given perfect
knowledge of the wireless channel between the source and the
destination, is it possible for a sophisticated external attacker
to drive their channel capacity to zero in stealth?
To answer the above question, we envisage sophisticated
threat models arising out of full-duplex radios [2] that operate
as hidden relays in between a source and a destination.
Loosely speaking, this threat comes under the well-known
framework of man-in-the-middle attacks, wherein the attacker
can manipulate the transmitted symbols before they reach
the destination. Although instantaneous modification of trans-
mitted symbols has been addressed in theory to mitigate
interference in wireless networks [3], [4], [5], this has not
been studied as a threat to wireless security. In this work, we
propose a new adversarial attack on wireless communication
between two legitimate users, wherein the attacker, who is
appropriately positioned between the two users, manipulates
the symbols in the air. Specifically, in the case of Binary
Phase Shift Keying (BPSK), the attacker flips the BPSK
symbols at 50% rate independently, thereby driving the mutual
information of the channel to zero. We refer to such an
attacker as Cognitive Radio from Hell (CRFH), wherein the
phrase from hell highlights the legitimate users’ inability to
avoid this attack. The proposed attack from CRFH can be
viewed as a form of correlated jamming [6], [7], wherein the
jammer has full or partial knowledge about the transmitter’s
signals.
We first apply the proposed attack on frequency-flat nar-
rowband communication channels, and subsequently discuss
its impact on frequency-selective wideband communication
channels. Due to practical constraints on applying this attack
on wideband channels, we discuss a variant of the attack
wherein the transmitted symbols on the delayed paths are
manipulated, while keeping the symbol on the first significant
path untouched.When perfectly executed, this attack can force
the destination to combine the observations from all the paths,
thereby degrading the error-performance. From the legitimate
users’ perspective, we discuss methods to detect this attack
and also propose heuristics to improve the error-performance
under the attack. Throughout the paper, we refer to the source,
the destination, and the attacker as Alice, Bob, and Eve,
respectively.
II. FLIPPING ATTACK ON NARROWBAND CHANNELS
Consider a narrowband communication channel between
two legitimate players Alice and Bob (each equipped with
single antenna), characterized by the signal model
yk =
√
Phxk + nk, (1)
where yk ∈ C is the received symbol by Bob at the k-th time-
instant, xk ∈ {−1,+1} is the BPSK symbol transmitted by
Alice, nk ∈ C is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
distributed as CN(0, σ2), and h ∈ C represents the fading
coefficient distributed as CN(0, 1). We have used binary phase
shift keying (BPSK) constellations for the sake of introducing
the flipping attack. However, this attack can also be gener-
alized to higher-order constellations. The average signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) of this channel is P
σ2
. We assume a quasi-
static fading channel where the realization h is fixed over
several consecutive symbol intervals. We denote the symbol
period by Ts seconds, and use tmain to denote the time taken
Fig. 1. In the flipping attack, the attacker instantaneously modifies the
symbols in the air such that the receiver views the compound channel
shown above. From information processing inequality, it is easy to verify
that I(x : y) = 0 with perfect execution of the flipping attack.
by the symbol to reach Bob. For the above described model, let
us imagine a sophisticated adversarial attack initiated by Eve,
who is physically positioned somewhere between Alice and
Bob. We envisage a powerful attack, referred to as the flipping
attack, wherein Eve is able to receive the transmitted symbol
from Alice, decode it, and then transmit a suitably modified
version to Bob within the symbol period. With such a strong
attack model, let the additional processing-delay introduced by
Eve be tp seconds, and the additional path-delay introduced by
Eve be tside seconds. With that, the modified symbol reaches
Bob after tp + tside seconds. Provided we have
tmain ≤ tp + tside << tmain + Ts, (2)
it is clear that Bob cannot resolve the transmitted symbol
from Alice and the one manipulated by Eve. If we denote
the manipulated symbol by f(x, h, g), where g is the channel
between Eve and Bob, then the received symbol after the
attack is
yk =
√
Phxk + gf(xk, h, g) + nk. (3)
In the flipping attack, Eve chooses the function f(·) such that
gf(xk, h, g) = −2
√
Phxk, which implies that Eve has perfect
knowledge of g and h. With such an “in the air” modification,
Bob will receive a flipped version of the transmitted symbol,
given by
yk = −
√
Phxk + nk. (4)
In the case of no attack, the received symbol is as given in (1).
Note that if the attacker decides to flip the symbols at 50%
rate independently, then the BPSK symbols would go though
the effective channel as shown in Fig. 1. We can envision
the attacker to flip the BPSK symbols by tossing a fair coin
independently, thereby resulting in Bernoulli distribution with
probability 0.5. The following proposition on the above attack
is straightforward to prove.
Proposition 1: From the information processing inequality
[8], the mutual information I(x : y) of the compound channel
shown in Fig. 1 is zero.
The condition in (2) indicates that both path-delay and
processing-delay through Eve are bottlenecks for perfectly
executing the flipping attack. In extreme narrow-band com-
munication, i.e., when the symbol period Ts is much larger
than the delay introduced by Eve, a perfectly executed flipping
attack can drive the channel capacity to zero. However, in
wideband communication, i.e., when Ts is extremely small
relative to the effective delay introduced by Eve, the modified
symbol gf(x, h, g) is likely to reach Bob after the current
symbol period. This implies that Bob will have to treat the
delayed modified symbol from Eve as noise, which in turn
will lower the signal-to-interference-noise ratio (SINR) of the
next transmitted symbol. In such a case, although the delayed
modified symbol degrades the error-performance, this is not
the intended consequence of the flipping attack. Recall that
the primary objective of the flipping attack is to drive the
channel capacity to zero in stealth.
III. FLIPPING ATTACK ON WIDEBAND CHANNELS
It is clear that driving the channel capacity to zero through
the flipping attack is challenging when the symbol period Ts
is extremely small. However, a variant of this attack can be
envisioned on a certain class of frequency-selective wideband
channels, wherein multiple copies of the transmitted symbol
arrive at Bob at different symbol periods; This way Eve gets
sufficient time to execute the flipping attack on the delayed
copies. Such channels are characterized by the signal model
yk =
Ld−1∑
l=0
hlxk−τ(l) + nk, (5)
where yk denotes the baseband sample received by Bob at
k-th symbol period, and {hl | 0 ≤ l ≤ Ld − 1} denotes the
set of fading coefficients associated with the delayed copies.
Here τ(l) denotes the delay of l-th copy measured in terms of
number of samples. We refer to each of these copies as a tap.
Unlike in (1), we use P = 1 in the signal model in (5). The
practical constraints on executing the flipping attack forbids
Eve from flipping the BPSK symbol arriving on the first
significant tap, i.e., on h0. However, it is reasonable to assume
that Eve can flip the BPSK symbols arriving on subsequent
taps as she gets relatively longer time for processing and
forwarding the received signals. In this case, we assume that
Eve has perfect knowledge of the power-delay profile (PDP)
of Alice-Bob’s channel, and also its realizations.
Henceforth, throughout the paper, (i) h0 is referred to
as the main tap, whereas {hl | 1 ≤ l ≤ Ld − 1} are
referred to as secondary taps, and (ii) flipping attack refers
to the case when the symbol on the main tap is undisturbed,
whereas the symbols on the secondary taps may be flipped
independently at 50% rate. In practice, the feasibility of
executing the flipping attack depends on PDP of Alice-Bob’s
channel, particularly the delay of the secondary taps with
respect to the main tap. Note that the objective of the attacker
is to make sure that signals received on the secondary taps
carry no information about the transmitted symbol.
A. Flipping Attack
We assume that Alice and Bob communicate over a wide-
band channel using a DSSS system, wherein an N -length
spreading code, which is securely shared between them, is
applied on each of the BPSK symbols. We assume that Eve
can accurately flip the chips with perfect knowledge of the
channel estimates of Alice-Bob, Alice-Eve, and Eve-Bob.
With perfect attack, Eve flips the BPSK symbols at 50% rate.
Note that once Eve decides to flip a BPSK symbol, she has
to flip all the N chips associated with that symbol. At the
destination, Bob uses RAKE receivers to resolve the symbols
arriving on the Ld taps. After suitable correlation operation
using the N -length spreading code on the received samples,
Bob arrives at the Ld equivalent received symbols, given by
yk,l = hlxk + zk,l, 0 ≤ l ≤ Ld − 1,
where the new subscript l is used to represent symbols
received from the l-th finger, and zk,l is the effective AWGN,
distributed as CN(0, σ2), resulting from the correlation oper-
ation of the RAKE receiver. With that, the received symbols
from the Ld fingers are of the form
yk,0 = h0xk + zk,0,
yk,l = bk,lhlxk + zk,l, 1 ≤ l ≤ Ld − 1,
where the polarity of bk,l ∈ {−1, 1} depends on attacker’s
choice. With uncoded communication, the Maximum Likeli-
hood (ML) decoder expression is given by
x˜k = argminx∈{−1,+1}
Ld−1∑
l=0
|yk,l − hlx|2, (6)
where hl is the perfect estimate of the channel on the l-th
tap. It is clear from (6) that that attacker can force degraded
error-performance by flipping symbols on some of the taps.
On the defensive side, the receiver Bob may choose to use
only the main tap fearing that the secondary taps might have
been flipped. In such a case, the decoding operation is given
by
x˜k = argminx∈{−1,+1}|yk,0 − h0x|2. (7)
Note that although the attacker’s signals are not affecting
the error-performance using (7), the overall error-performance
will be worse than the no-attack case because Bob has not
incorporated all the independent taps. In the next section,
through simulations, we demonstrate the impact of the flipping
attack on wideband frequency-selective channels with two taps
and four taps in the delay-spread domain.
B. Simulation Results
In our setup, data communication between Alice and Bob
takes place through a sequence of frames. Each frame con-
stitutes 100 BPSK symbols, out of which 20 are occu-
pied by the pilots. The pilot symbols, which are a priori
fixed between Alice and Bob, also take values from BPSK
constellation {−1, 1}. At Alice, a block of input bits of
length 3968 bits are fed to a Rate- 12 turbo encoder in
feed-forward configuration [7 5], whose details are avail-
able in reference [9]. The corresponding output bits (7889
bits in number) are spread across the data part of several
frames. Once the data and pilot symbols are packed, the
frames are transmitted sequentially through a DSSS system,
i.e., each BPSK symbol is multiplied by a spreading se-
quence of chip-rate N = 128. The frames are transmit-
ted through the following wireless channels: (i) a two-tap
channel with average power-profile {E{|h0|2}, E{|h1|2}} =
{0.5, 0.5}, and (ii) a four-tap channel with average
power-profile {E{|h0|2}, E{|h1|2}, E{|h2|2}, E{|h3|2}} =
{0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1}. We assume that each hl is a circularly-
symmetric complex Gaussian random variable, whose real-
ization remains fixed throughout the frame, and takes an
independent value in the next frame.
Meanwhile, Bob uses RAKE receivers to resolve the domi-
nant multipaths in the channel, and also estimates the channel
realization on each tap using the pilot symbols. Subsequently,
Bob combines the received symbols from all the taps to obtain
log-likelihood ratio (LLR) on each BPSK symbol. Finally, the
LLRs from each frame are forwarded to the turbo decoder,
which processes them to decode the information bits. A total
of 10 iterations is used for the message passing algorithm in
the turbo decoder.
In Fig. 2, we plot the Bit Error Rate (BER) performance of
the above discussed system on the two-tap channel in three
scenarios: (i) without attack - Eve does not flip the symbols on
any tap, and Bob combines the observations on both taps, (ii)
with attack - Eve flips the symbols on the second tap at 50%
rate independently, and Bob combines the observations on
both taps, and finally (iii) with attack - Eve flips the symbols
on the second tap at 50% rate independently, and Bob discards
the symbols received on the second tap. The plots indicate that
an attack-ignorant Bob will experience error-floor behaviour
in BER by blindly combining the observations on both taps,
whereas an attack-aware Bob can recover the bits with some
SNR loss by discarding the observations from the secondary
tap. Similar experiments are also repeated for the four-tap
channel, and the corresponding BER results are presented in
Fig. 3. In this case, we consider the following attack scenarios:
(i) only the fourth tap is attacked, (ii) both the third and the
fourth taps are attacked, (iii) second, third, and fourth taps are
attacked. The plots in Fig. 3 show that Bob can avoid degraded
error-performance if he can somehow detect the attacked taps
and discard them when computing the LLR values.
To obtain the simulation results in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we have
assumed that Eve knows the locations of the pilot symbols,
and therefore she does not flip the pilots. As a result, Bob is
able to estimate the channel on each tap accurately. However,
since Eve strategically flips only the data symbols at 50% rate,
Bob is forced to combine all the taps as he is attack-ignorant.
Thus, an important question to answer along this direction is
how can Bob identify an unreliable tap? This question will
be addressed in the next section.
C. Attack Detection Techniques
From Eve’s perspective, a critical task is to attack only on
the data symbols. When this is ensured, Bob cannot detect the
attack. On the other hand, when Eve flips the pilot symbols as
well, then Bob can detect this attack by observing the polarity
of the received symbols on the pilot locations. Therefore,
from the legitimate users’ perspective, in order to detect
the flipping attack they must obfuscate the location of pilot
symbols in every frame so that Eve is forced to flip some
of the pilot symbols. To achieve this, we enable Alice and
Bob to share a secret key using which the random positions
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Fig. 2. Turbo-coded error-performance on a two-tap channel with perfect
estimate of Alice-Bob’s channels at Eve. “A-2, C-1” implies that Eve flips
the symbols on the second tap at 50% rate, while Bob combines the received
symbols on first tap to obtain the LLR. Similarly, “A-2, C-12” implies that
Eve flips the symbols on the second tap at 50% rate, while Bob combines the
received symbols on the first and the second taps to obtain the LLRs. The plots
show that combining the flipped symbols degrades the error-performance.
of the pilots are determined. Since the positions of pilots are
randomly chosen based on a pseudo-random generator, Eve
cannot distinguish the pilots in the frame. Meanwhile, Bob’s
strategy is to observe the polarity of the received symbols on
the pilot locations, and then detect the attack if at least one
of the pilot symbols is flipped.
By observing the polarity of the received symbols on the
pilot locations, there is a non-zero probability with which
Bob fails to detect the attack. At high SNR values, this
event corresponds to the case when the positions of the
flipped symbols do not coincide with the positions of the pilot
symbols. At low SNR values, the change in the polarity of the
pilot symbols may happen either due to the attack or due to
the additive noise on each symbol. Therefore, to compute the
probability of misdetection, we need to consider the event
when the ambient noise unflips the pilot symbols already
flipped by Eve. At arbitrary SNR values, the probability of
misdetection for a given frame can be computed as
P
(l)
miss =
L∑
j=1
pj(1− p)L−j
[
j∑
x=0
(
Lp
x
)(
L− Lp
j − x
)
qxl
]
, (8)
where
(
n
r
)
denotes “n choose r” operation, and ql =
prob(yk,l < 0 | xk = 1, hl), which is identical to prob(yk,l >
0 | xk = −1, hl). To compute the expression in (8), we assume
that Eve flips the bits based on tossing a coin independently
L times. For a given frame, since the fading coefficient hl
is constant, the value of ql is determined by the channel
realization as well as the additive noise variance.
Similar to the events causing misdetection, events causing
false alarm occur when at least one of the received symbols
on the pilot locations is flipped due to the additive noise in
the case of no attack. The corresponding probability of false
alarm can be computed as
P
(l)
false = 1− (1 − ql)Lp . (9)
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Fig. 3. Turbo-coded error-performance on a four-tap channel with perfect
estimate of Alice-Bob’s channel at Eve. Notations in the legend are similar
to those in Fig. 2. The plots show that Eve has to flip the secondary taps
with significant energy to force degraded error-performance at Bob.
For a given SNR value, i.e., for a given ql, the expression in
(9) indicates that P
(l)
false increases as Lp increases. However,
the behavior of P
(l)
miss, given in (8), as a function of q is not
straightforward. As a result, in the rest of this section, we
plot P
(l)
miss and P
(l)
false against different values of Lp, L and
ql. In Fig. 4, we present the above values when L = 100
and when Lp takes values from {1, 2, . . . , 20}. The plots in
Fig. 4 show that for a given value of ql, P
(l)
miss decreases as
Lp increases, while P
(l)
false increases with Lp. However, when
q is sufficiently small (i.e., high SNR values), P
(l)
miss can be
reduced while keeping P
(l)
false within acceptable range. This
discussion shows that Bob can accurately detect the presence
of Eve at high SNR values by observing the polarity of the
received symbols on the pilot locations. Furthermore, with
correct detection, Bob can decide whether to combine the
received symbols on a secondary tap with the main tap or
not. As shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, Bob can be conservative
to drop the attacked taps, and just decode the information
from the main tap only. In such a case, although there
is error-performance loss, the receiver can still decode the
information bits. On the other hand, if the attack-ignorant
receiver combines all the taps without validating the polarity
of the pilot symbols, then it would result in substantially
degraded error-performance.
In the next section, we consider the case when Eve does
not have perfect knowledge of Alice-Bob’s channel. With
inaccurate estimate of the channel, we explore whether Bob
can take advantage of this situation to improve the error-
performance than that of just decoding from the main tap.
IV. FLIPPING ATTACK: INCORRECT CHANNEL ESTIMATES
In practice, the knowledge of the channel estimate at Eve
may not be accurate. Let the channel estimate of the l-th tap
of Alice-Bob’s channel at Eve be denoted by hˆl = hl + ǫl,
where hl is the corresponding estimate at Bob and ǫl is the
estimation error at Eve. Since we are focusing on one of the
secondary taps, we henceforth drop the subscript l in this
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Fig. 4. Probability of misdetection (MD) and probability of false alarm (FA)
for various values of Lp and q (we discard the subscript l) with L = 100.
The receiver detects the flipping attack if at least one of the received symbols
on the pilot locations has changed its polarity.
section. With flipping attack using incorrect channel estimate
at Eve, the received symbol at Bob is of the form
yk = (−h− 2ǫ)xk + zk.
In the above expression, Eve has attempted to flip the trans-
mitted symbol from xk to −xk. However, because of incorrect
channel estimate, the received symbol at Bob is offset by
−2ǫxk compared to the case of perfect estimate.
When the estimation error ǫ is non-negligible, we will show
that Bob can identify the flipped data symbols, and subse-
quently undo the modifications to some extent. Let us assume
a frame based communication between Alice and Bob with L
denoting the length of the frame and Lp denoting the number
of pilot symbols, which are transmitted at random positions
in the frame. Since the positions of the pilots are generated
based on a shared key, Eve does not know the pilot locations.
Furthermore, since the pilots are also BPSK symbols, Bob can
distinguish between a flipped and unflipped pilot symbol by
observing the polarity of the received symbols. For the sake
of exposition, we use an indicator variable A to represent
the attack event. Within a frame, the expected value of the
received symbols corresponding to the flipped BPSK symbols
are
E{yk|xk = 1,A = 1} = −h− 2ǫ, (10)
E{yk|xk = −1,A = 1} = h+ 2ǫ, (11)
where the expectation E{·} is over the symbols of the frame.
In (10) and (11), A = 1 indicates the attack event. In the case
of no attack, similar values are given by
E{yk|xk = 1,A = 0} = −h, (12)
E{yk|xk = −1,A = 0} = h. (13)
If Lp is sufficiently large, Bob can obtain the estimates of the
above statistics in (10)-(13) by observing the pilot symbols.1
Then, if the difference |E{yk|xk = 1,A = 1} − E{yk|xk =
1In order to obtain the statistics in (10)-(13), we assume that Eve has
flipped some pilot symbols from −1 to 1, and some from 1 to −1.
1,A = 0}| is greater than 2σ, then Bob proceeds to undo the
flipping attack as discussed below.
Using the above estimates, Bob will observe the rest of the
L − Lp symbols (the data symbols) in the frame, and then
identifies the symbols that were flipped by Eve. The rationale
behind this approach is that the flipped symbols are likely to
be closer to −h−2ǫ or h+2ǫ, instead of −h or h. Using this
idea, Bob first identifies the locations of the data symbols that
are closer to −h−2ǫ or h+2ǫ than−h or h. Let these locations
be denoted by I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , L}. Similarly, Bob identifies the
locations of the data symbols that are closer to −h or h than
−h− 2ǫ or h+2ǫ. Let these locations be denoted by I¯. With
this information, Bob changes the polarity of the received
symbols on I, while retaining the polarity of the symbols on
I¯. Finally, the updated received symbols {yk} are suitably
combined with those of the main tap in order to decode the
information symbols. Specifically, for each symbol yk, Bob
combines it with the main tap depending on his confidence
on how close the received symbol is to the offset versions. In
particular, Bob generates an LLR as follows
∆k = log

e−|yk−(h+2ǫ)|
2
σ2 + e
−|yk−(−h−2ǫ)|
2
σ2
e
−|yk−h|
2
σ2 + e
−|yk+h|
2
σ2

 , (14)
which quantifies his confidence on whether the received
symbol is close to {−h− 2ǫ, h+2ǫ} or {−h, h}. Here, σ2 is
the variance of the additive noise. From the above confidence
metric, when ∆k < −δth, for some optimization parameter
δth, Bob first changes the polarity of yk before including it
with the corresponding symbol from the main tap. On the
other hand, when ∆k > δth, Bob uses yk as it is before
including it with the corresponding symbol from the main
tap. Finally and importantly, when −δth ≤ ∆k ≤ δth, Bob
discards yk, which implies that his confidence is not high to
decide whether the symbol is flipped or otherwise. It is intu-
itive that when ǫ is small, Bob cannot confidently distinguish
between flipped and unflipped data symbols, and therefore,
the best strategy is to neglect those received symbols on the
tap. Otherwise, combining the symbols despite low confidence
would only degrade the error-performance as explained in the
previous section.
A. Simulation Results
In this section, we present simulation results to demonstrate
that Bob can leverage on the estimation error at Eve to
improve his error-performance compared to the conservative
option of just using the main tap. The simulation setup in this
section is same as in Section III. However, a major distinction
is that the knowledge of the channel estimate at Eve is not
accurate. We have chosen the estimation error to be either
50% or 100% to drive the point that Bob can significantly
improve the performance. Bob first computes the estimates of
the expressions in (10)-(13) using the pilot symbols, and then
classifies the data symbols as either flipped or otherwise. The
coded BER performance with incorrect estimate of the two-
tap channel is presented in Fig. 5. In the presented results,
“A-2, C-1” denotes the case when the second tap is attacked,
whereas Bob uses first tap to obtain the LLRs. Similarly, “A-2,
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A−2, SC−12, 50% CSI error
A−2, SC−12, 100% CSI error
Fig. 5. Turbo-coded error-performance on a two-tap channel with imperfect
estimate of Alice-Bob’s channels at Eve. With channel estimation error at
Eve, Bob opportunistically distinguishes between flipped and unflipped data
symbols to some extent to improve the error-performance.
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Fig. 6. Turbo-coded error-performance on a four-tap channel with imperfect
estimate of Alice-Bob’s channels at Eve.
SC-12” denotes that second tap is attacked, and Bob smartly
combines the symbols on the second tap with that of the
first tap based on the LLR in (14). The plots in Fig. 5 show
that with larger values of ǫ, Bob can opportunistically use
the secondary tap to his advantage. We have used δth = 0.5
as the threshold to distinguish the flipped and unflipped data
symbols.
We conducted similar experiments on the 4-tap channel
with average power-profile {0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1}, and the cor-
responding results are presented in Fig. 6. We have assumed
100% channel estimation error at Eve in this case. To obtain
the results we used δth = 1 for all the cases. Similar to the
plots in Fig. 5, the plots in Fig. 6 also show that the estimation
error at Eve can be opportunistically used to improve the error-
performance at Bob. It is interesting to note that the BER
improvements from unflipping the symbols on the fourth tap
(in the case of “A-4, SC-1234”) is negligible, whereas BER
gains from unflipping the received symbols on the second,
third and the fourth taps (in the case of “A-234, SC-1234”)
are significant. This behaviour is attributed to the fact that the
fourth tap alone contributes negligible signal power, whereas
the signal power contributed by the second, the third and the
fourth taps together are comparable to that of the main tap.
We highlight that the choice of δth is crucial in reaping BER
improvements from the attacked taps. While smaller values of
δth include symbols on the unreliable taps into the decoding
process thereby degrading the performance, larger values of
δth forces Bob to discard the received symbols on the attacked
taps, thereby matching the performance of that of combining
the unattacked taps.
V. DISCUSSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
We have discussed a strong adversarial attack on DSSS
systems wherein the attacker instantaneously modifies the
transmitted symbols such that some of the delayed copies
carry no information on the transmitted data. Unlike jamming
attack, this attack when perfectly executed, cannot be detected
at Bob by measuring the SINR variations. Perfect execution
of this attack necessitates the attacker to accurately know
all the channel realizations in the model. Given that DSSS
uses wideband communication, all the underlying channels
in the model are frequency selective, and this implies that
Bob may also receive multiple copies of the manipulated
symbols transmitted by Eve. In this work, we have assumed
that Eve nulls all the multipath components that she generates
by converting the Eve-Bob’s channel from frequency-selective
to frequency-flat. However, in practice, this assumption needs
unlimited power, and as a result, Bob may also receive
multiple copies of the manipulated symbols from the attacker.
It is interesting that Bob, who is oblivious to the presence
of the attacker, may see more taps than that in Alice-Bob’s
channel, and the total number of taps depends on whether
the delay profiles of Alice-Bob’s and Eve-Bob’s channels
coincide. How can Bob opportunistically take advantage of
no or imperfect nulling of multipaths in Eve-Bob’s channel?
is an interesting direction for future work.
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